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Crypto-Miner Incident Analysis — Monero (XMRig) via C3Pool
Date: 2026-07-09 to 2026-07-10 System: Debian 13 (cloud VM), 150G disk, 15G RAM, 8 vCPUs Classification: Crypto-currency mining malware with multi-layer persistence Method: Remote code execution via exposed Docker container port + empty DOCKER-USER iptables chain
Overview
On 2026-07-09, a Monero (XMR) crypto-miner was discovered on this system. The miner had been operating undetected for approximately 10 days (since June 30, 2026). Multiple persistence mechanisms made it resilient — killing processes alone was insufficient.
Critical vulnerability: The Docker DOCKER-USER iptables chain was empty (default Docker install state), so all Docker container ports were directly reachable from the internet. The host INPUT chain was correctly locked down (only 22/80/443), but Docker traffic bypasses INPUT via FORWARD → DOCKER-USER.
Key Findings
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Malware | XMRig v6.26.0 (Monero miner) |
| Mining Pool | C3Pool (auto.c3pool.org) |
| Entry Vector | Exposed Docker container ports via empty DOCKER-USER chain |
| Initial Access | June 30, 2026, ~13:43 UTC |
| Persistence | 4 mechanisms: cron + 2x systemd + trojanised init.d |
| C2 Server | minio.daviduwu.ovh → 203.188.174.67 (self-hosted MinIO) |
| Backdoor Binary | bun-dda — 690MB bun debug build (JavaScript runtime for payload) |
| Impact | CPU 100% for ~10 days, 2.1G swap exhausted, system near-unresponsive |
| systemd restarts | 31,804 failed restart attempts by discovery (binary already deleted) |
Contents
- timeline/ — Chronological incident timeline
- evidence/ — Raw evidence (firewall dumps, port scans, service files)
- persistence/ — Detailed analysis of all 4 persistence mechanisms
- binaries/ — Malware binary analysis (bun-dda, xmrig)
- network/ — C2 infrastructure, entry vector analysis
- replication/ — Fully scripted replication for sandbox analysis
- cleanup/ — Cleanup procedure + hardening guide